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In this paper I analyse the relationship among R&D, market structure and 10 appropriability 
indicators in the Brazilian manufacturing at firm level, linking an industry and an innovative 
survey for 2003 and 2005 for more than 16.000 companies. The main results are: market 
share has positive impact on the R&D expenditure decision, except if innovation patents and 
trade  market  are  protection  mechanisms;  lagged  profits  have  positive  impact  on  R&D 
decision; writing or strategic appropriability mechanisms alone has negative impact on the 
R&D expenditure decision; and advertisement and a mix of appropriability mechanisms had 
positive impact on the R&D expenditure decision. 
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Neste  artigo  analiso  a  relação  entre  P&D,  estrutura  de  mercado  e  10  indicadores  de 
apropriabilidade a  partir de  dados por firma para  a indústria brasileira de transformação, 
conectando  informações  de  pesquisas  industriais  e  de  inovação  tecnológica  para  mais  de 
16.000 empresas. Os principais resultados são: parcela de mercado tem impacto positivo na 
decisão de gastos com P&D, exceto quando patentes de inovação e marcas são utilizadas 
como mecanismos de apropriabilidade; lucros defasados tem impacto positivo na decisão de 
P&D; mecanismos de apropriabilidade estratégicos e por escrito, quando utilizados sozinhos, 
tem impacto negativo na decisão de gasto com P&D; e propaganda e mix de mecanismos de 
apropriabilidade têm impacto positivo na decisão de gastos com P&D.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A  technological  innovation  can  be  a  radical,  an  incremental  or  a  revolucionary  change 
through  new  product  or  process.  Some  of  the  main  inputs  to  a  successful  technological 
innovation is research and development (R&D) expenditures – but it isn`t the only one. Low 
or  high  concentrated  market  structure  and  appropriability  mechanisms  are  important 
innovation determinants as well.  
 
In  the  beginning  of  the  theoretical  discussion  about  market  structure  and  innovation, 
monopoly power and firm size were considered an extra advantage to innovation, as they 
reduce  uncertainty  (KAMIEN  and  SCHWARTZ,  1982).  Just  a  few  about  other 
appropriability mechanisms than patent were examined. Quite recently research, however, 
show that protection to some inventions maximize innovation rate in some industries, but not 
in others (HUNT, 2004); and better advertisement incentive R&D (QI, 2008).  
 
Empirical  evidence  from  the  1950`s  to  the  1970`s  suggested  not  conclusive  relationship 
between market concentration and research effort, basically because of data quality available 
– few firms or just some industries, as chemistry and drugs (KAMIEN and SCHWARTZ, 
1975).  Empirical  evidence  from  the  1970`s  to  the  1980`s  suggested  that  patent  were 
important to only a few industries. In others firms used others appropriability tools as trade 
mark and copyright. But it is not clear how each kind of appropriability mechanism impact on 
innovative activity (COHEN and LEVIN, 1989). 
 
Further  evidences showed that  firms in the American manufacturing sectors  protect their 
innovation`s  profits  not  only  through  patents  but  using  a  mix  of  intellectual  property 
mechanisms. Among them patents are the less used, while industry secret and leading time 
are the most applied (COHEN, NELSON and WALSH, 2000).And patent is not always the 
best appropriability option (HALL and ZIEDONIS, 2001), and others intellectual properties 
protection  mechanisms  that  not  patents  can  also  have  positive  effects  on  the  economy 
(MORTIMER, 2007). 
 
Notwithstanding, patents have some limits as an appropriability mechanism in developing 
countries and R&D spend couldn’t be the best measure to innovative effort in those kind of 
nations,  where  competition  has  a  negative  effect  on  innovation  (GORODNICHENKO, 
SVEJNAR and TERRELL, 2008).  
 
International comparisons show that, in 1997, R&D expenditure in Brazil was around 1.22% 
of it GDP, far below than the traditional innovative countries as Japan, whose R&D/GNP 
ratio was around 2.94%. And private firms spend around 0.39% of Brazilian GDP on R&D, 
while government spend 0.83%. (JENSEN, MENEZES-FILHO and SBRAGIA, 2004). 
 
Some  studies  to  Brazilian  manufacturing  sectors  showed  that  net  profit  margins  had  no 
influence  on  R&D  expenditures,  may  be  because  it  is  a  long  run  investment  (JENSEN, 
MENEZES-FILHO and SBRAGIA, 2004); that industrial firms reaction to trade openness in 
the  1990`s  was  rationalize  productive  process  to  improve  manufacturing  efficiency,  but 
keeping  them  away  from  R&D  activities,  new  projects  and  strengthen  trade  marks  (DE 
NEGRI, SALERNO and CASTRO,2005) – results according to World Bank analysis, which Page 3/17 
 
show that research projects are concentrated in developed countries (THE WORLD BANK, 
2008). 
 
In fact, understand the relationship among innovation, market structure and appropriability is 
really  important,  as  those  variables  have  strong  impact  on  firms,  sectors,  regions  and 
countries behaviour. 
In this study I go beyond the traditional analysis among market structure, R&D and patents, 
as I will analyse nine others appropriability mechanisms than patents, as trade market and 
industry secret and advertisement – this one recently used by Lee (2005) in an empirical 
study to South Korea.  
Our main results are not significant correlation among R&D expenditure and market share, 
lagged profits and appropriability mechanisms. However, we found some interesting results 
considering  R&D  expenditure  decision:  market  share  has  positive  impact  on  the  R&D 
expenditure  decision,  except  to  innovation  patents  and  trade  market  as  protection 
mechanisms;  lagged  profits  have  positive  impact  on  R&D  decision;  writing  or  strategic 
appropriability mechanisms alone has negative impact on the R&D expenditure decision; and 
advertisement and a mix of appropriability mechanisms had positive impact on the R&D 
expenditure decision. 
 
This paper has 4 sections further than this introduction: section 2 reviews recent theoretical 
and  empirical  analysis  about  R&D,  market  structure  and  appropriability,  stressing  recent 
approaches  which  consider  advertisement  as  an  appropriability  mechanism;  section  3, 
econometric models; section 4, results and interpretations; and section 5, conclusions. 
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2.  RELATED LITERATURE  
 
In this section I present recent theoretical and empirical analysis about R&D, market structure 
and  appropriability,  stressing  the  recent  approaches  which  consider  advertisement  as  an 
appropriability mechanism.  
 
2.1 Recent theoretical analysis  
 
The relationship among patentability, industrial structure and innovation become important in 
recently theoretical discussions. Some theoretical models find the patentability ratio which 
maximizes  the  innovative  ratio.  This  analysis  shows  that  some  inventions  maximize 
innovation ratio in some industries, but not in others. And that patentability standards affect 
expected profits as it influence firm`s probability to innovate be a competitive advantage, and 
the speedy at this advantage will reduce (HUNT, 2004). 
 
Advertisement and innovation is a subject few analysed. Besides many formal and informal 
apropriability mechanisms, as patents and designing, advertisement is a protection option 
sometimes far efficient than formal ones.  
 
In fact, either discover something new and register in a patent office or show it to as many 
potential buyers as possible, the second option could be financially better than the first one. 
And once something is associated to a company, competitors will have an extra difficult 
because more than imitate or create, they will need to persuade potential buyers that their 
products are as good or better than that company which first find something new and ad it.  
 
According  to  Bagwell  (2007),  under  economic  point  of  view,  there  are  three  kinds  of 
advertisement: persuasive, informative and complementary.  
 
Persuasive ad has as objective change preferences, creating a spurious product differentiation 
and increasing fidelity. As a result, firm product demand becomes more inelastic, allowing 
firm charge higher prices. In this case ad means higher barriers to entry,  which is  more 
efficient if there are economies of scale in production and/or in advertisement. In doing so, 
persuasive ad has an anti-competitive effect once it has any real value to consumers but 
create only an artificial product differentiation, whose result is higher concentration, prices 
and profits (BAGWELL, 2007). 
 
Informative ad consider that consumers has imperfect information, once there is search cost 
to find out relevant goods and services characteristics to decision making as price, quality and 
technical details. This imperfection can bring inefficiencies to the market. Informative ad 
would be a low cost solution to minimize asymmetric information. As a result, firm product 
demand becomes more elastic and makes firms entrant easier, once companies can being 
known  easier,  as  well  it  prices  and  products.  So,  this  kind  of  ad  is  pro-competitive 
(BAGWELL, 2007). 
 
At  least,  advertisement  complementary  perspective  suggests  that  ad  does  not  change 
consumer preferences, as persuasive one. They assume a stable preference set and that ad 
complements goods and service, as social fashion one (BAGWELL, 2007).   
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But, does have ad dynamic effect on firms` competitive advantage (DORASZELSKI and 
MARKOVICH, 2007)? Using a dynamic game with perfect Markovian equilibrium, where 
firms advertise repeatedly, are rivals in product market and take entry and exit decisions, two 
advertisement standards are analysed: one affects consumers sympathy to firms and other 
influence consumers who knows this firm. This model shows that either strong regulation or 
forbidden  advertisement  have  anticompetitive  effects  with  negative  impact  on  firms` 
competitive advantage.  
 
Qi (2008) complements ad effects on innovation showing that, on one hand, ad also allows 
firms  inform  their  consumers  about  something  new  on  the  market.  In  this  sense,  ad 
improvement means more R&D. On the other hand, intense ad about a known good suggests 
strong competition and it can reduce entrant innovative efforts. In this sense, innovation can 
reduce new firms entrance. To sum up, sectors where strategic interaction is higher, there is 
antagonist powers over how advertisement influences R&D.  
 
Qi (2008) theoretical and numerical simulation analysis, both according to Doraszelski and 
Markovich (2007), shows how better advertisement technology (which means lowers cost) 
will increase or reduce R&D. Considering perfect price discrimination, goods not known to 
consumers but gradually being known through ad, each firm has goods with specific quality, 
and that each good is protected by patent, better ad increase entrance deterrence. So, worse ad 
technology (which means higher ad costs) could increase local innovation ratio. But any 
advertisement reduces sectorial growth as none information will be available to consumers.  
 
2.2 Recent empirical evidence  
 
Recently  empirical  analyses  used  better  data  base  and  computational  and  econometric 
methods, which allows check some details not usually considered, as advertisement impacts 
on R&D and others not patent appropriability mechanisms as copyright and leading time to 
competitor.  
 
Data  available  informs  that  drug  industry  has  high  R&D  expenditure  but  higher 
advertisement budget. It also informs that innovation and ad are complementary as a non 
price competition (CABRAL, 2000). 
 
Expenditure on advertisement and R&D analysis of drug industry firms in eight therapy areas 
(asthma, migraine, obesity, Parkinson`s disease, seizure disorder, depression, lipid disorder, 
and gastric and duodenal ulcer) between 1995 and 2001 shows that technical advertisement 
has positive effect on new clinical products. The chronic disease market with high technical 
and detailed ad is more interesting to firms on drug industry. But the effects of advertisement 
on new products development were inconclusive (KWONG and NORTON, 2007).  
 
Not only patents but also others intellectual protection tools have positive effects on the 
economy. Copyright laws, for example, incentive technological innovation and brought better 
price discrimination in the US VHS and DVD market (MORTIMER, 2007).   
 
In fact, intellectual protection through patents is not always the best option for many firms. It 
motivates  Cohen,  Nelson  and  Walsh  (2000)  try  explain  why  some  American  companies 
register  patents  and  others  not.  Analysing  data  from  1478  R&D  labs  in  the  American 
manufacturing industry in 1994, they found that firms protect their innovation profits not only 
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secret  and  leading  time.  Among  those  mechanisms,  patents  are  the  fewest  used  while 
industrial secret and leading time are the most common.  
 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) agree with Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000): patent is not always 
the best option. In some cases, there is a patent paradox, as illustrate an empirical study about 
95 firms pattern standard in the US semiconductor industry between 1979 and 1995 – an 
industry whose main characteristic is fast technological change and cumulative innovation. It 
showed that those firms not always use patent to protect their R&D profits - which is a 
paradox in a high and fast technological change sector.  
 
If patent sometimes is not the best option in developed countries, patents data limitations in 
developing  countries  became  it  not  the  best  source  of  information  about  innovation.  In 
general,  data  patents  have  three  important  restrictions:  i)  they  measure  inventions  not 
innovation, ii) patents standard change according to country, industry and process and iii) 
companies frequently use alternative protection tools as industrial secret and leading time 
(GORODNICHENKO, SVEJNAR and TERRELL, 2008).  
 
At  least,  R&D  expenditure  is  not  always  the  best  measure  to  innovative  effort  in  those 
countries because not all innovations are generated by R&D expenditures, R&D does not 
necessarily lead to innovation (they are an input rather than an output), and formal R&D 
measures are biased against small firms (GORODNICHENKO, SVEJNAR and TERRELL, 
2008). 
 
2.3 R&D, market structure and appropriability  
 
Recently Lee (2005) analysed the relationship between market concentration and industry 
R&D  intensity  conditional  to  appropriability,  inclusive  advertisement,  to  South  Korean 
manufacturing  sector.  His  data  base  to  1983  had  sectorial  information  about  R&D  and 
advertisement expenditures, revenue, concentration ratio and price-cost margin to 426 South 
Korean  manufacturing  sectors  SIC  5  digit  disaggregation  level.  Sectorial  appropriability 
indicators were from The Yale Survey (LEVIN et alli, 1987) to USA. Sectors were classified 
as high (137) and low (289) appropriability levels.  
Lee (2005) cross section empirical evidence to South Korean manufacturing sectors shows 
that  market  concentration  and  R&D  expenditure  are  positively  correlated  in  the  low 
appropriability  sectors,  which  suggests  that  market  concentration  supplements  low  R&D 
appropriability or that technological competence (or opportunities) may not be fully exerted 
(or exploited) when market structure remains atomistic. However, market concentration and 
R&D expenditure are negatively correlated in the high appropriability sectors, which suggests 
that  high  R&D  appropriability  supplements  market  concentration  or  that  technological 
competence (or opportunities) may be fully exerted (or exploited) when market structure goes 
to oligopoly.  
 
Lee (2005) cross section analysis also found that profit has not significative correlation with 
R&D  expenditure,  except  in  high  appropriability  sectors  that  showed  weak  negative 
correlation.  The  results  have  not  substantial  change  if  advertisement  is  considerer 
appropriability mechanisms.  
 
As we said, patent is not always the best appropriability option (HALL and ZIEDONIS, 
2001),  patents  information  from  developing  countries  has  many  restrictions  and  R&D Page 7/17 
 
expenditure  is  not  always  the  best  measure  to  innovative  effort  in  those  nations 
(GORODNICHENKO, SVEJNAR and TERRELL, 2008). In this exercise I analyse firm and 
not sectorial data and there is 9 appropriability indicators further than patent.  
 
3.  ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
 
In this section I present the econometric models used to analyse the relationship between 
R&D and market structure, conditional to appropriability.  
 
I analyse a short and unbalanced panel data of information from innovative and industrial 
surveys
1  to  2003  and  2005.  In  all  regressions  I  consider  10  appropriability  mechanisms. 
According  to  IBGE,  The  Brazilian  Census  Bureau,  five  of  them  are  writing  protection 
mechanisms – patents of invention (PI), utility model patent (UMP), industry design register 
(IDR), trade  marks (TM)  and copyright  (C) – and three of them are strategic  protection 
mechanisms – design complexity (DC), industrial secret (IS) an leading time to competitors 
(LTC). This data base also has “others” appropriability mechanism category, which each firm 
specify, and advertisement expenditure (ADV). We also consider that a firm can use a mix of 
appropriability methods (MAM). In fact, a firm can, at the same time, register a patent, has a 
design complex and expend on advertisement.  
 
I run two panel regressions, close to Lee (2005). Those panel regressions avoids endogenity 
problem, especially because of simultaneity between R&D expenditure and profitability. It 
also allows check lagged profitability impact on R&D expenditure and on R&D expenditure 
decision.  The first one is a classical panel linear regression: 
 
(1) lnredit = α0 + α1MSit + α2MS
2
it + α3LNPCM1it + α4LNPCM2it + α5MSit*AIit+ α6MS
2
it*AIit 
+ α7AIit+ Ψit + εit 
 




it market share  square,  LNPCM1it and LNPCM2it are the first and second price-cost 
margin
3 log lagged, AIit is one of the ten appropriability mechanisms above used alone or 
mixed, MSit*AIit is the market share-appropriability indicator interaction, MS
2
it*AIit is the 
market share square-appropriability indicator interaction, and Ψit is the firm fixed effects. It is 
important remark that market share measure market concentration and firm size at the same 
time.  
 
As  R&D expenditure is not always  the  best measure  to innovative effort, a probit panel 
regression is an option to R&D expenditure data problems. So, our second regression is: 
 
(2) R&Dit = α0 + α1MSit + α2MS
2
it + α3LNPCM1it + α4LNPCM2it + α5MSit*AIit+ α6MS
2
it*AIit 
+ α7AIit+ Γit + εit 
 
where R&Dit is a dummy variable, which is 1 if firms had expended on R&D  and 0 on the 
contrary. It represents the firm R&D expenditure options. Γit is the firm random effect as any 
probit panel regression. All other variables are like (1) above.  
                                                              
1 The innovative survey is Pesquisa de Inovação Tecnológica (PINTEC) and the industrial survey is Pesquisa Industrial 
Anual (PIA), both of them by The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).  
2 MSit= firm i at year t revenue/sector revenue at year t, where sector is SIC 4 digit disaggregation level.  
3 PCMit= (net revenueit + ∆ inventoriesit – payrollit – operational costsit)/(net revenueit +∆ inventoriesit), as suggested by 
Domowitz, Hubbart and Petersen (1986).  Page 8/17 
 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
In  this  section  I  show  the  results and  interpretations  to  empirical  evidence  got  from  the 
econometric models showed in the last section. I begin showing the descriptive statistics, 
which gives a good picture of our data base, which has information from 2003 and 2005 for 
more than 16.000 companies. Just after, I show and interpret the regressions results.  
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics to continuous variables (TABLES 1 and 2) show us that among 
16626 firms, 3823 (23%) spent in R&D and that the R&D/net revenue ratio (R&D) average is 
4%.The standard deviation (38.3%) and percentiles shows substantial dispersion. 75% of the 
firms in this sample had R&D/net revenue ratio lower than 1.4%. R&D/net revenue ratio 
median 0.4% is close to 0.39% aggregated spending found by Jensen, Menezes-Filho e Braga 
(2004).  
 
Market Share (MS) average is 0.9%, with standard deviation 3.9% and 75
th percentile 1.4%. 
Price cost-margin (PCM) average is 64%, with median 71%, standard deviation 23.7% and 
percentiles  5
th  23%  and  75
th  82%.  At  least,  the  advertisement/net  revenue  ratio  (ADV) 
average is 0.3%, median 0.02%, standard deviation 1.2% and 75
th percentile 0.3% 
 
To sum up, those descriptive statistics show us that R&D/net revenue ratio is bigger than the 
ad/net revenue ratio, market share is lower than 1.5% for at least 75% of the firms in this 
sample, and at least 50% of them have price cost-margin bigger that 71%. They also show us 
a significant dispersion of all variables described.  
 
TABLE 1 – continuous variables descriptive statistics  
Variable  Observations  Average  Standard Deviation 
R&D  3823  0.04  0.46 
MS  16626  0.009  0.041 
MS
2  16626  0.0018  0.023 
PCM  16626  0.64  0.237 
ADV  16626  0.003  0.012 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
TABELA 2 – continuous variables percetiles  
Variable  P5  P25  P50  P75  P95 
R&D  0  0.001  0.004  0.015  0.07 
MS  0.0001  0.0007  0.0034  0.014  0.11 
MS
2  0  0  0  0.0002  0.012 
PCM  0.23  0.57  0.71  0.82  0.93 
ADV  0  0  0.0002  0.003  0.028 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
Let`s have a look on discrete variables frequencies. TABLE 3 show us that among the five 
writing protection mechanisms, patents of invention (PI) was used by 6.22% of the firms in 
our sample, utility model patent (UMP) by 5.47%, industry design register (IDR) by 4.98%, 
trade  marks  (TM)  by  22.97%  and  copyright  (C)  by  2.44%.  Among  the  three  strategic Page 9/17 
 
protection  mechanisms, design  complexity  (DC)  was  used  by  2.59%  of  the firms  in  our 
sample, industrial secret (IS) by 10% and leading time to competitors (LTC) by 5.74%. Other 
appropriability mechanisms, which each firm specify, by 2.8%, and a mix of appropriability 
methods (MAM), which include advertisement, by 49.74% of the firms in this sample. As we 
said, a firm can, at the same time, register a patent, has a design complex and expend on 
advertisement. It justifies use MAM.  
 
TABLE 3 – firms that used appropriability protection mechanisms  
 
 (%)  PI  UMP  IDR  TM  C  DC  IS  LTC  others  MAM   
Yes  6.22  5.47  4.98  22.97    2.44  2.59  9.99  5.74  2.80  49.74 
No  93.78  94.53  95.02  77.03  97.56  97.41  90.01  94.26  97.20  50.26 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
TABLE 4 show us that 11% of the firms in our sample spent on (internal)
4 R&D and TABLE 
5  inform  us  that  53%  of  that  firms  had  continuous  (internal)  R&D  activity  and  47% 
occasional.  
 
TABLE 4 – firms that spent on R&D 
R&D      % 
Spent  10.89 
Not spent  89.11 
Total   100.00 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
TABLE 5 – firms that had continuous or occasional R&D activity 
R&D activity     % 
Continuous  53.21 
Occasional  46.79 
Total   100.00 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
4.2 Regressions  
 
Here I show the results and interpretations based on the panel regressions, which are adapted 
from Lee (2005). A short and unbalanced panel avoid endogeneity because of simultaneity 
between R&D expenditure and profits, and allow us check how lagged profits influence on 
R&D expenditure. It will be check through a regression like (1) described in the econometric 
models section.  
 
Our results to R&D expenditure, market structure and appropriability (TABLE 6) show us 
that R&D  expenditure and  market  share  are  not  correlated,  except in  the  regression that 
consider advertisement as an appropriability mechanism, which has a negative correlation. It 
suggests that ad as appropriability mechanisms supplements market share.  
  
                                                              
4 According to IBGE, internal R&D means R&D from firm`s own resources. It does not include spend on adoption of 
technology, for example.  Page 10/17 
 
The relation between R&D expenditure and lagged profits is close R&D expenditure and 
market share: there isn`t significative correlation among them, except to the second lagged 
profit in the regression with ad as appropriability mechanism, where it is negative.  
 
The  relation among  R&D  expenditure  and appropriability  mechanisms  here  is  also  quite 
interesting: except to trade market (TM), there isn`t significative correlation among R&D 
expenditure  and  appropriability  mechanisms.  R&D  expenditure  and  TM  have  negative 
correlation, which suggests that TM is substitute strategic investment to R&D expenditure. 
As market share means firm size and market concentration at the same time, this result also 
suggests that smaller firms that used TM as appropriability mechanisms spent more on R&D.  
 
Market share square (MS
2) and it interaction with appropiability mechamisms (MS
2*IA), and 
MS*IA are not correlated with R&D expenditure. F tests also suggests that appropriability 
mechanisms are not important to market share, expect to trade mark.  
 
According  to  recent  literature  (GORODNICHENKO,  SVEJNAR  and  TERRELL,  2008) 
developing countries have R&D expenditure levels far lower than developed. It is particularly 
low  in  Brazil,  as  show  the  descriptive  statistics  above,  which  inform  us  that  the  R&D 
expenditure/revenue  ratio  median  is  0.4%  and  that  75%  of  the  companies  have  R&D 
expenditure/revenue  ratio  below  1.4%.  This  low  R&D  expenditure/revenue  could  be 
influencing the results above.  
 
An alternative to low R&D expenditures should be check market share and appropriability 
mechanisms impact on R&D expenditure decision, which can be analysed using an R&D 
expenditure dummy variable, which is 1 to companies that have been spent on R&D and 0 to 
that have not. It will be check through a probit panel regression like (2) described in the 
econometric models section above. The results are in the TABLE 7.  






                       
                 
TABLE 6: R&D expenditure, appropriability and market structure  - panel regressions  
              
                                   
lnred  PI  UMP  IDR  TM  C  DC  IS  LTC  others  lnadv  MAM 
CONSTANT  -4.72(0.30)***  -4.93(0.32)***  -4.95(0.34)***  -4.51(0.26)***  -4.77(0.487)***  -4.58(0.44)***   -4.87(0.27)***  -4.74(0.32)***  -4.83(0.45)***  -4.96(0.40)***  -5.18(0.33)*** 
MS  -5.36(3.61)  -3.60(3.58)  -5.53(3.68)  -3.00(3.06)  -5.40(4.53)  -7.36(5.07)  -6.04(3.26)*  -9.22(3.63)***  -8.09(6.68)  -7.43(4.11)*  -14.14(16.76) 
MS
2  6.74(5.31)  3.66(4.84)  4.08(5.33)  -0.60(4.68)  4.23(6.30)  10.26(8.51)  6.06(5.05)  12.13(5.47)**  5.83(13.53)  9.08(6.30)    59.82(90.97) 
LNPCM1  0.05(0.34)  0.091(0.34)  0.086(0.34)  0.16(0.33)  0.08(0.34)  0.10(0.34)  0.087(0.34)  0.07(0.34)  0.07(0.34)  0.197(0.443)  0.10(0.34) 
LNPCM2  -0.29(0.39)  -0.31(0.39)  -0.31(0.39)  -0.23(0.39)  -0.30(0.39)  -0.29(0.39)  -0.30(0.395)  -0.285(0.39)  -0.305(0.39)  -1.26(0.51)**  -0.32(0.39) 
MS*AI  0.14(1.96)  -0.94(1.74)  0.12(1.69)  -1.81(1.73)  -0.04(2.11)  0.85(2.44)  0.478(1.80)  2.23(1.75)  1.36(3.19)   -0.60(0.72)  8.51(16.58) 
MS
2*AI  -1.75(3.31)  0.39(2.53)  0.28(2.57)  4.02(3.11)   0.32(3.04)  -2.55(4.20)  -1.05(3.46)  -4.64(3.03)  -0.61(6.72)   1.10(1.23)  -54.83(90.83) 
AI  -0.15(0.14)  -0.028(0.15)  -0.022(0.158)  -0.26(0.12)**  -0.11(0.23)   -0.20(0.21)  -0.066(0.126)  -0.13(0.146)  -0.080(0.21)   0.07(0.06)  0.206(0.314) 
total R
2  0.0789  0.0731  0.0698  0.0585  0.0727  0.0765  0.0704  0.0623  0.0696  0.0672  0.0132 
within groups R
2   0.0179  0.0147  0.0117  0.0305  0.0119  0.0148  0.0118  0.0147  0.0126  0.0194  0.0136 
between groups R
2  0.0874  0.0832  0.0802  0.0632  0.083  0.0873  0.081  0.0716  0.08  0.072  0.0106 
Test F                        
All variables  F(7,758)=1.98*  F(7,758)=1.61  F(7,757)=1.28  F(7,758)=4.41**  F(7,758)=1.31  F(7,758)=1.63  F(7,758)=1.29  F(7,758)=1.61  F(7,758)=1.39  F(7,649)=1.83  F(7,758)=1.49 
MS,MS
2  F(2,758) =1.14  F(2,758) =0.64  F(7,757)=2.17  F(2,758) =2.69*  F(7,758)=1.20  F(7,758)=1.12  F(7,758)=2.28  F(7,758)=3.27  F(7,758)=2.44*  F(7,649=)1.67  F(7,758)=0.50 
MS*AI, MS
2*AI  F(2,758)=0.83  F(2,758)=0.67  F(2,757) =0.09  F(2,758)=0.89  F(2,758) =0.02  F(2,758) =0.37  F(2,758) =0.05  F(2,758) =1.24  F(2,758) =0.50  F(2,649) =0.41  F(2,758) =0.21 
MS*AI, MS
2*AI, AI  F(3,758)=1.72  F(3,758)=0.87  F(3,757)=0.06  F(3,758)=5.03**  F(3,758)=0.17  F(3,758)=0.92  F(3,758)=0.13  F(3,758)=0.88  F(3,758)=0.36  F(3,649)=0.56  F(3,758)=0.60 
Observations  3106  3106  3105  3106  3106  3106  3106  3106  3106  2633  3106 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys                  
***,**,* means  1%,5% and 10% significance level, respectively  
Note: lnred is R&D/net revenue ratio log, MS is market share, MS
2 is market share square, LNPCM1, LNPCM2 is price cost margin log lag 1 and 2, MS*IA is market share- appropriability indicator interaction, MS
2*IA is 
market share squared- appropriability indicator interaction. PI is patent of invention dummy (1 if firm had patent of invention, zero on the contrary), UMP is utility model patent dummy , IDR is industry design register dummy, 
TM is trade market dummy, C is copyright dummy, DC is design complexity dummy, IS is industrial secret dummy, LTC is a leading time to competitors dummy, “others” is other appropriability machanisms used by the firms 
dummy, lnadv is advertisement/net revenue ratio log, and MAM is a mix of appropriability mechanisms dummy variable, which includes advertisement (it is one of a firm used one or more appropriability mechanism, inclusive 
ad, and zero on the contrary).  
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The results  in the TABLE 7  suggest that market  share has  positive impact on the R&D 
expenditure decision, except to innovation patents (IP) and trade market (TM) as protection 
mechanisms,  where  they  are  not  significative.  It  means  that,  in  general,  market  share 
supplements  those  appropriability  mechanisms  (except  to  IP  and  TM  as  appropriability 
mechanism), or that technological competence (or opportunities) may not be fully exerted (or 
exploited) when market structure remains atomistic. 
 
Lagged profits have positive impact on R&D decision in all regressions, which suggests that 
firms use private financial source to R&D activities. 
 
Writing  or  strategic  appropriability  mechanisms  alone  has  negative  impact  on  the  R&D 
expenditure decision. It means that firms choose between writing or strategic appropriability 
mechanisms alone and R&D expenditure decision, or they are substitute strategic investment. 
As market share means firm size and market concentration at the same time, this result also 
suggests that the smallest firms that used writing or strategic appropriability mechanisms 
alone as appropriability mechanisms spent more on R&D.  
  
Nonetheless,  advertisement  –  a  kind  of  appropriablility  mechanism  -  and  a  mix  of 
appropriability mechanisms (MAM) had positive impact on the R&D expenditure decision. It 
means  that  firms  choose  both  those  appropriability  mechanisms  and  R&D  expenditure 
decision, or they are complementary strategic investment. As market share means firm size 
and market concentration at the same time, this result also suggests that the biggest firms that 
used ad and MAM as appropriability mechanisms spent more on R&D.  
 
Market share square (MS
2) and it interaction with appropiability mechamisms (MS
2*IA), and 
MS*IA are not correlated with R&D expenditure (except to others, ad and MAM). χ
2 tests to 
panel  regression  subset  of  variables  suggests  that  appropriability  mechanisms  have 
significative impact on market share.  
 







                    TABLE 7 : R&D dummy  appropriability and market structure - probit panel regressions              
                             
DR&D  PI  UMP  IDR  TM  C  DC  IS  LTC  others  lnadv  MAM 
CONSTANT  1.78(0.178)***  1.45(0.19)***  1.39(0.22)***  0.51(0.105)***  0.39(0.29)  1.147(0.287)***  1.18(0.143)***  1.62(0.20)***  1.21(0.31)***  0.037(0.1)  -2.26(0.072)*** 
MS  6.85(2.961)  13.34(3.88)***  8.06(5.48)  16.92(2.15)***  8.21(4.30)**  9.40(4.60)***  10.90(2.47)***   8.40(3.10)***  25.18(7.91)***  9.41(1.82)***  10.42(1.80)*** 
MS
2  -4.42(5.015)  -14.11(6.05)***  -0.47(17.53)  -16.85(3.23)***  -5.67(6.42)  -11.20(7.25)  -6.36(3.86)*  -9.59(5.068)*  -44.95(15.79)***  -10.17(3.06)***  -6.85(2.72)*** 
LNPCM1  0.32(0.10)***  0.348(0.106)***  0.345(0.109)***   0.32(0.11)***  0.357(0.11)***  0.36(0.11)***  0.31(0.10)***  0.36(0.107)***  0.361(0.11)***  0.54(0.125)***  0.41(0.095)*** 
LNPCM2  0.32(0.098)***  0.314(0.10)***  0.317(0.103)***  0.276(0.101)***  0.32(0.10)***  0.312(0.103)***  0.27(0.09)***  0.31(0.10)***  0.317(0.103)***  0.27(0.123)***  0.304(0.09)*** 
MS*AI   1.96(1.56)  -0.978(1.989)   1.96(2.78)  -3.26(1.23)***  2.19(2.19)  1.42(2.346)  -0.106(1.35)   1.31(1.63)  -6.48(3.97)*  -0.605(0.285)**   2.91(1.86) 
MS
2*AI  -3.68(2.65)   1.054(3.11)  -6.07(8.80)  2.73(1.93)  -3.90(3.31)  -0.82(3.70)  -3.27(2.19)  -0.986(2.66)   16.12(7.92)**   0.70(0.46)  -7.967(2.868)*** 
AI  -1.22(0.092)***  -1.06(0.099)***  -1.03(0.11)***  -0.66(0.059)***  -0.516(0.147)***  -0.895(0.145)***  -0.94(0.07)***  -1.14(0.10)***  -0.93(0.15)***  0.17(0.014)***  1.22(0.062)*** 
Log Vero  -4672.20  -4712.00  -4732.70  -4676.42  -4796.52  -4777.70  -4663.37  -4706.20  -4762.28  -4728.55  -6063.90 
Test χ
2  
All variables   χ
2 (7)=611.11***  χ
2 (7)=522.43***  χ
2 (7)=489.74***  χ
2 (7)=522.54***  χ
2 (7)=436.54***  χ
2 (7)=456.76***  χ
2 (7)=610.52***  χ
2 (7)=526.50***  χ
2 (7)=464.71***  χ




2 (2)=10.94***  χ
2 (2)=13.83***  χ
2 (2)=7.87**  χ
2 (2)=72.51***  χ
2 (2)=7.12**  χ
2 (2)=4.86*  χ
2 (2)=37.23***  χ
2 (2)=9.27***  χ
2 (2)=10.21***  χ




2 (2)=1.94  χ
2 (2)=0.28  χ
2 (2)=0.53  χ
2 (2)=10.04***  χ
2 (2)=1.41*  χ
2 (2)=1.07  χ
2 (2)=9.38***  χ
2 (2)=1.39  χ
2 (2)=4.57  χ
2 (2)=4.97*  χ
2 (2)=9.40*** 
MS*AI, MS
2*AI, AI  χ
2 (3)=247.74***  χ
2 (3)=172.67***  χ
2 (3)=131.04***  χ
2 (3)=226.62***  χ
2 (3)=16.01***  χ
2 (3)=52.40***  χ
2 (3)=263.46***  χ
2 (3)=180.89***  χ
2 (3)=75.49***  χ
2 (3)=171.09***  χ
2 (3)=471.96*** 
Observations  8073  8073  8072  8073  8073  8073  8073  8073  8073  9276  14379 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys              
***,**,* means  1%,5% and 10% significance level, respectively  
Note: DR&D is R&D dummy variable (1 if firm spent on R&D, 0 on the contrary), MS is market share, MS
2 is market share square, LNPCM1, LNPCM2 is price cost margin log lag 1 and 2, MS*IA is market share- 
appropriability indicator interaction, MS
2*IA is market share squared- appropriability indicator interaction. PI is patent of invention dummy (1 if firm had patent of invention, zero on the contrary), UMP is utility model patent 
dummy , IDR is industry design register dummy, TM is trade market dummy, C is copyright dummy, DC is design complexity dummy, IS is industrial secret dummy, LTC is a leading time to competitors dummy, “others” is other 
appropriability machanisms used by the firms dummy, lnadv is advertisement/net revenue ratio log, and MAM is a mix of appropriability mechanisms dummy variable, which includes advertisement (it is one of a firm used one 
or more appropriability mechanism, inclusive ad, and zero on the contrary). 
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It is important remark that our results about innovation and market structure (conditional to 
appropriability) are according to the debate about this subject.  
 
In the beginning of theoretical analysis about concentration and market structure, market 
power  and  firm  size  were  considered  an  extra  advantage  to  innovation,  as  they  reduce 
uncertainties  (KAMIEN  and  SCHWARTZ,  1982).  However,  appropriability  mechanisms, 
especially  those  not  patent,  were  not  part  of  the  discussion.  Recently,  some  theoretical 
analysis predicts that protect some inventions maximize innovation ratio in some industries, 
but not in others (HUNT, 2004); and that better advertisement improve R&D (QI, 2008).  
 
Earlier empirical evidence to concentration and innovation relationship found between 1950`s 
and 1970`s were not conclusive because of the kind of data available – to a few companies or 
to selected sectors, as chemistry and drugs (KAMIEN and SCHWARTZ, 1975). Empirical 
evidence found between 1970`s and 1980`s show us that patent were important just to some 
industries, but in others firms choose others kind of appropriability mechanisms, as trade 
mark or copyright (COHEN and LEVIN, 1989).  
 
Recent evidence suggested that American manufacturing companies protect their profits from 
innovation using not only patents but also a mix of appropriability mechanisms. Among the 
appropriability  mechanisms used, patents are on  the  lowest used and industry secret and 
leading time are among the top used (COHEN, NELSON and WALSH, 2000). And more: 
patent is not always the best appropriability mechanism (HALL and ZIEDONIS, 2001) and 
not only patents but others appropriability mechanisms have positive effects on the economy 
(MORTIMER, 2007). At least, additional research found that patents have strong limitations 
as appropriability mechanism in developing countries, and that R&D expenditure is not the 
best  measure to  innovative  effort  in those nations (GORODNICHENKO, SVEJNAR and 
TERRELL, 2008).  
 
International comparisons show that R&D expenditure in Brazil was around 1.22% of it GDP 
in 1997, far below the traditional innovative countries as Japan, whose R&D/GNP ratio was 
around 2.94%. And private firms spend around 0.39% of Brazilian GDP, while government 
spend 0.83% (JENSEN, MENEZES-FILHO and SBRAGIA, 2004). 
 
Some  studies  to  Brazilian  manufacturing  sectors  showed  that  net  profit  margins  had  no 
influence  on  R&D  expenditures,  may  be  because  it  is  a  long  run  investment  (JENSEN, 
MENEZES-FILHO and SBRAGIA, 2004); that industrial firms reaction to trade openness 
was rationalize productive process to improve manufacturing efficiency, but keeping them 
away from R&D activities, new projects, stronger trade marks (DE NEGRI, SALERNO and 
CASTRO,2005)  –  results  according  to  World  Bank  analysis,  which  show  that  research 
projects are concentrated in developed countries (THE WORLD BANK, 2008). 
 
Our  results  show  not  significant  correlation  among  R&D  expenditure  and  market  share, 
lagged profits and appropriability mechanisms. However, we found some interesting results 
considering  R&D  expenditure  decision:  market  share  has  positive  impact  on  the  R&D 
expenditure  decision,  except  to  innovation  patents  and  trade  market  as  protection 
mechanisms, where they are not significative; lagged profits have positive impact on R&D 
decision in regressions; writing or strategic appropriability mechanisms alone has negative 
impact on the R&D expenditure  decision; and advertisement  – a  kind of appropriablility Page 15/17 
 
mechanism - and a  mix  of appropriability  mechanisms had  positive impact on the R&D 
expenditure decision. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
It is the first analysis I know about R&D and market struture conditional to appropriability to 
Brazilian manufacturing firms. Our results bring new evidence to this important subject to 
one of the BRICs. The main are:  
 
i) not significant correlation among R&D expenditure and market share, lagged profits and 
appropriability mechanisms.  
 
ii) Market share has positive impact on the R&D expenditure decision, except to innovation 
patents  (IP)  and  trade  market  (TM)  as  protection  mechanisms,  where  they  are  not 
significative.  It  means  that,  in  general,  market  share  supplements  those  appropriability 
mechanisms  (except  to  IP  and  TM  as  appropriability  mechanism),  or  that  technological 
competence (or opportunities) may not be fully exerted (or exploited) when market structure 
remains atomistic. 
 
iii) Lagged profits have positive impact on R&D decision, which suggests that firms use 
private financial source to R&D activities. 
 
iv) Writing or strategic appropriability mechanisms alone has negative impact on the R&D 
expenditure decision. It means that firms choose between writing or strategic appropriability 
mechanisms alone and R&D expenditure decision, or they are substitute strategic investment. 
As market share means firm size and market concentration at the same time, this result also 
suggests that the smallest firms that used writing or strategic appropriability mechanisms 
alone as appropriability mechanisms spent more on R&D.  
  
v)  Advertisement  –  a  kind  of  appropriablility  mechanism  -  and  a  mix  of  appropriability 
mechanisms (MAM) had positive impact on the R&D expenditure decision. It means that 
firms choose both those appropriability mechanisms and R&D expenditure decision, or they 
are  complementary  strategic  investment.  As  market  share  means  firm  size  and  market 
concentration at the same time, this result also suggests that the biggest firms that used ad and 
MAM as appropriability mechanisms spent more on R&D.  
 
To sum up, or results suggests that the mix of appropriability mechanism effect and market 
share  are  important  to  firm`s  R&D  expenditure  decision  in  the  Brazilian  manufacturing 
sector.  
 
Recent literature register that R&D is not the best innovative effort measure. May be better 
check  market  share  and  appropriability  mechanisms  impact  on  process  and  product 
innovative decision process, either to the firm or to the market.  It is going to be our next 
empirical analysis.  
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